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THE NEW REGIME OF LABOUR RELATIONS CRIMES
IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
CHUKS OKPALUBA*
i. THE GENESIS OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CRIMES
The story of the criminal prosecution of workers who combine with
a view toward improving their lot in the work place has been told by
several labour historians in the common law world.1 It suffices to state
here that Caribbean trade unions share a common legal experience with
those in the United Kingdom.2 Although there seems to be no reported
cases, trade union historians have shown that workmen's combinations
were illegal in the Caribbean 3 before the introduction of trade unions
legislation. 4 The crime of criminal conspiracy was imported into this area
by English judges for the purpose of frustrating collective actions by
workers. The resort to the criminal conspiracy weapon meant two things:
firstly, combinations by workers to alter their wages were a crime; 5 sec-
ondly, the taking of collective action in the nature of withdrawal of labour
was similarly a crime.'
After the enactment in the U.K. of the Trade Union Act, 1871 and
the removal of criminal conspiracy by the Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act, 1875, the Courts developed the concept of civil conspiracy 7
and in 1964 patented a tort of intimidation, 8 notwithstanding the immuni-
ties given to trade unions by the 1871, 1875 and the Trade Disputes Act
of 1906.
In the Caribbean, the crime of conspiracy for collective labour actions
has been abolished9 and trade unions are immune from tort actions10 but
criminal prosecutions were retained for withdrawal of labour in the so-
called essential industries.1t Thus, Fraser, J.A., commenting on the essence
of the Trade Union Ordinance of Trinidad and Tobago, observed that:
*LL.B., LL.M. (Lond.); Senior Lecturer in Law, University of the West Indies,
St. Augustine, Trinidad, West Indies. This article is part of a research project into
Compulsory Labour Adjudication in Trinidad & Tobago commissioned and financed
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From time to time the rules and principles of the common law have
been made to give way to ameliorate changes by legislation in order
to create conditions more conducive to vigorous growth of the trade
union movement. 12
In that regard, the learned judge continued:
Legislation has not been used as an instrument of suppression but
rather as an instrument of abstention. It has been used to safeguard
activities of trade unions by protecting them against fraud and
saving their members indirectly from the inequality of bargaining
power. It has restrained the sanctions of the criminal law and granted
relief from the weight of civil action."
Legislation has neutralised the common law illegalities of trade unions
not by positively declaring collective labour activities legal as such, but
by exempting them from criminal prosecution and civil action if done in
certain circumstances, namely, in furtherance of a trade dispute. In Colly-
more v. Attorney General the question confronting the Justice of Appeal
was whether "a person who in doing an act which is exempted by statute
from penal sanctions or from claims for compensation for civil injury,
can be said to have acquired a right to do that act." This question arose
in the process of the Court of Appeal's deliberations as to whether the
enactment of the Industrial Stabilisation Act, 1965 violated the plaintiffs'
right to strike, in that it contravened their constitutional'1 and common
law rights.15 The Court answered in the negative.16
The challenge in that case was prompted by the emergence in Trini.
dad and Tobago of the regime of industrial relations crimes created by
the Industrial Stabilisation Act, 1965 (ISA). The introduction of that
piece of legislation saw the genesis of a set of crimes peculiar to industrial
relations which could be committed only by parties thereto. These crimes
were intended to fortify the establishment of the system of compulsory
labour adjudication in an industrial relations atmosphere that was basically
a free-for-all type where every conceivable labour dispute, however trivial,
was capable of giving rise to strike action or lockout. The sudden
transformation from the latter system to one heavily compulsory neces-
sitated the creation of crimes, in order, apparently, to coerce obedience and
compliance with the rules and restraints laid down in the Act.17
All of these crimes were, in turn, constituted summary offences and
within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Courts."8 When the Industrial
Relations Act, 1972 (IRA), repealed the ISA, these offences were resur-
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rected, some reclassified and new crimes created. While the greater bulk
of the offences are still summary, some have been renamed "industrial
relations offences" and one is now the crime of contempt of Court. Unlike
the summary offences, the others are within the jurisdiction of the In-
dustrial Court.
There are now three categories of offences dealing with breaches of
the law of labour relations in Trinidad and Tobago. Leaving aside the
classification of these crimes, it is interesting to note the differences of
approach between the two types of Courts that are entrusted with the
administration of these offences. In view of the different rules with re-
spect to burden of proof, evidence, and procedure which obtain in the
Industrial Court, one wonders whethei the offences with which it deals
could be properly be described as crimes.
The prosecution of both the unions and the workers for committing
these offences may give rise to legal problems of varying dimensions.
There are procedural problems. Getting the alleged offender into Court,
coupled with the question of whether a trade union can be subjected to
prosecution, may occasion problems. Assuming that a corporate employer
and a trade union can be prosecuted, it is important, in order to attach
liability, to discover when the crime can be said to have been committed.
Several of these issues came before the Court of Appeal in Transport and
Industrial Workers Union v. Fernandes.19 These issues and other prob-
lems connected with the industrial relations crimes form the theme of
this article.
II. IDENTIFYING THE OFFENCES
A. The New Summary Offences
Section 71 of IRA confers upon workers certain rights in respect of
trade union membership and activities, and correspondingly, the right not
to be a member of any trade union or any particular trade union.20 When
a worker decides to become a member of a trade union or, while already
a member of a trade union, participates in the union's activities, the em-
ployer may not complain. By virtue of section 42, the employer is pro-
bibited from dismissing or treating the worker in any way to the worker's
prejudice because of his union interests or connections. It is a summary
offence where the employer conducts himself to the contrary. Nor can
the employer make a worker's membership or noninvolvement in a trade
union a condition of employment.2' For an infraction of these provisions,
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the fine is up to $5,000. Where all the circumstances of the offence have
been proved, the employer is entitled to a defence that he did not have
the specific intent in question.2
The prosecution of an employer was at issue in Raghunan & Others
v. Public Transport Service Corporation.23 The employer, in effect, had
dismissed workers for their trade union membership or activities.2 4 The
workers alleged breach of s.4(l) (d) of ISA (which was similar to the
provisions under discussion) against the employers for refusing them
employment after they had gone on strike in protest against a percentage
wage increase awarded by the Industrial Court. Their claims were dis-
missed by a magistrate. Before the Court of Appeal the workers argued
that by refusing to take the workers back after the strike, the employers
adversely affected their employment since they were members of a trade
union which was seeking better labour conditions. For the Corporation,
it was submitted that the workers' complaints were misconceived because:
(i) the workers' strike, due to dissatisfaction with the Industrial Court
award, was illegal under the Act; (ii) they were therefore in breach of
their contracts and no longer employees of the Corporation; and, (iii)
their remedy lay in appeal, not striking.
Fraser, J.A. (with whom de la Bastide, J.A. agreed) held that the
case did not fall within the contemplation of s.4 which deals with an em-
ployer dismissing an employee on account of his participation in trade
union activity. Secondly, a strike by workers because of their dissatisfac-
tion with the award was an offence under s.3 4 and in contempt of Court.
Finally, s.40 of the Act made the award of the Industrial Court binding
on all parties to the dispute, and the employees by their illegal conduct
broke their contracts of employment with the Corporation. 25 The magis-
trate's decision was affirmed.
The other three major summary offences are: offences in connection
with industrial actions in the essential services; failure by an employer
to comply with an agency shop order; and the so-called fraudulent medi-
cal certificates. 26
The taking of industrial action is prohibited in the essential services
because of the danger inherent in disruptive actions which inevitably
entail much hardship on the consuming public.27 Where an employer or
worker takes industrial action in the essential service, the employer or
the worker is liable to summary conviction. Those who call the strike or
cause the industrial action or persuade others to take such action may
also be prosecuted. Where a trade union calls a !.trike in the essential
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services, a conviction may lead to the cancellation of the union's certifi-
cate of recognition. The holder of an office in the union who induces or
persuades a worker to go on stiike is punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both. In addition he "shall he disqualified from holding office in any
trade union or other organisation for a period of five years after the
conviction." 2 s
To further buttress the prohibitions against industrial actions in the
essential services, summary conviction awaits any person who "for the
purpose of promoting or maintaining the conduct of industrial action
taken or continued in an essential service ...directly or indirectly con-
tributes financial assistance to an employer or a trade union that calls
for or causes such action to be taken or to any worker involved in such
action."'29 Nor are the recipients of such assistance absolved from criminal
conviction.30 Public Servants, members of the Prison Service, Fire Service,
Teaching Service and members of the Staff and other employees of the
Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago who participate in any industrial
action are, in accordance with s.69(2) also liable to summary conviction.
In similar fashion, the holder of an office in a trade union or in an or-
ganisation of persons within the category above listed "who calls for or
causes industrial action to be taken or any person or organisation induces
or persuades any other person to take such action" in any of the services,
is liable to summary conviction.
31
An innovation brought about by the IRA is the introduction of the
agency shop order which is:
an order made by the Board and binding on an employer, the recog-
nised majority union and the workers in the bargaining unit, whereby
it is directed in respect of all workers from time to time comprised
in the bargaining unit for which the union is certified, that the terms
and conditions of employment of those workers shall include a condi-
tion that every such worker must pay contribution in accordance
[with the provisions of the Act].32
Once such an order is made, the employer is under an obligation, any other
rule of law notwithstanding," to deduct the contribution from the wages
of the workers comprised in the bargaining unit as specified therein. 34 The
amount is, according to the specifications in the Act, to be paid over to
the recognised majority union. 35 A summary conviction may arise where
the employer against whom an agency shop order is made fails to comply
with its terms and conditions. 36
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The' strange offence of "fraudulent medical certificate" is committed
where a worker who, by deception, absents himself from his employ-
ment. 7 The section does not indicate whether or not the deception is to be
construed through the submission by the worker of the medical certificate.
The marginal note reads "fraudulent medical certificates" but the expres-
sion does not appear in the body of s.77(1) -nor indeed, in any other
part of the section. The work of the Court will then centre on the con-
struction of the meaning of the word "deception" which according to
s.77(5) means "the fraudulent or deceitful use of a medical certificate."
The interpretation of the terms "fraudulent" or "deceitful" therefore
consft;l,te the core of the crime.3 8
A medical practitioner who issues a medical certificate to a worker
for the purpose of enabling such worker, by deception, to absent himself
from his employment by means of such certificate is liable to summary
conviction. Amazingly, it is possible under s.77(3) that the medical prac-
titioner may be held guilty and the worker may not be convicted of this
offence. Such conviction would be possible where in "all the circum-
stances of the case the medical practitioner may reasonably be considered
to have acted for such purpose." It is further provided that in prosecuting
the medical practitioner:
It shall be competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence of all the
surrounding circumstances of the case, including the existence of
other medical certificates of the medical practitioner issued allegedly
for the purpose of enabling the worker or co-workers of the worker
in question by deception to absent himself or themselves, respectively,
from his or their employment by means of such certificates; and such
evidence shall be admissible notwithstanding any rule of law to the
contrary.39
In his defence, the medical practitioner could produce evidence to
show that he did not know, or had no reasonable cause to believe, that the
medical certificate would be used to enable the worker by deception to
absent himself from his employment. By this enactment, it would appear
that the legislator is questioning the integrity of the medical profession.
Furthermore, one wonders who is to decide whether a medical certificate
issued by a duly qualified and registered medical practitioner is, or is not,
issued for the purpose of deception. This argument will, of course, collapse
where the evidence is glaringly clear that a particular medical practitioner
issues medical certificates to workers without medically examining their
fitness or otherwise. Even in that instance, the medical practitioner may
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not know the fraudulent intent of the worker. Further, it is normal that
the burden will lie on the prosecution to prove beyond all reasonable
doubts the criminal intent of the practitioner 40
B. Contempt of the Industrial Court
It must be observed that the contempt offence within this context
is different from the usual contempt issues that may ordinarily arise in
the face of the Court or those unconnected with the Court's proceedings
but may tend to bring the integrity of the Court into disrepute.
41
S.66(1) prohibits the taking of any form of industrial action in
connection with a trade dispute while proceedings in relation to that dis-
pute are pending before the Industrial Court or the Court of Appeal.
42
s.66(2) prohibits the taking of industrial action as a result of disagreement
or dissatisfaction with an order or award of either the Industrial Court or
the Court of Appeal. 43 A contravention of any of these provisions amounts
to a contempt of the Industrial Court or the Court of Appeal, as the case
may be.
In Metal Box Trinidad Ltd. v. Union of Foods, Hotels and Industrial
Workers, the Industrial Court was faced with the interpretation of this
section. The Union, purportedly acting pursuant to the provisions of
s.84(I) complained that, having agreed with the Company for a cessation
of a strike action and a resumption of work; that the Union and Company
had jointly requested that the unresolved dispute be referred to the Indus-
trial Court; the Company subsequently refused to take back into its employ
fifty-five of the workers who struck; and that the Company instead is-
sued suspension notices and had in fact dismissed another fifty-two of the
workers.
The first issue was whether proceedings in relation to this dispute
were pending before the Court. If the answer was in the affirmative, then
the second question was whether the conduct of the Company was such
as to amount to a lockout? These two points were essential with regard
to s.66(1) and for the commission of a contempt of court as in s.66(3).
There was no doubt that the matter was referred to the Court on the
mutual request of the parties and that they had appeared for directions.
In this connection the union had proposed that the parties could only cease
industrial action by mutual consent. Convinced by the union's case, the
Court pointed out that in the circumstances, the requirement of s.66 that
industrial action should cease could not be complied with unilaterally.
The Court sought the assurance of the Company that arrangements had
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been made for a resumption of work. Such assurance was given and it
was the Company's failure to abide by that assurance that led to this
complaint. The Court found that the Company had given the assurance in
bad faith and without any intention of complying with it, while they (the
Court), had proceeded on the basis of the assurance to give directions for
the hearing of the matter. Therefore, the proceeding in relation to this
dispute were pending in the Court.
What action then did the Company take that gave rise to the com-
plaint? The Company was to admit the strikers to employment as agreed
on Monday, January 27. When the workers (140 of them) reported to
work on the agreed date, time and place, they were assembled in the
canteen and told that they would be interviewed for processing. On the
worker's insistence the Company agreed that a list of work assignments
would be posted on the main gate the next morning. This list assigned
work to 85 of these men and they were allowed to start work. The others
were told to go to the southern gate where they were given suspension
notices pending investigations into their alleged violent conducts during
the strike. Thirty of them were subsequently dismissed.
On the question of whether there was a lockout, the Company argued
that what they have done was merely take disciplinary action which it
was entitled to take and was not based on the fact that the men took
strike action. It was further argued that a lockout according to the Act
means that a suspension from employment or a refusal to employ workers
must be done to induce or compel workers to agree to terms and condi-
tions of or affecting employment.L 4 The Company claimed its action in this
matter was not done to compel workers to agree to terms or conditions of
employment. Even if the Company escaped liability by virtue of the inter-
pretation of the term "lockout," it had to show that the conduct complained
of was not an industrial action-a term of wider import than lockout-
which includes "any action" done by either of the parties to compel the
other to agree to terms of employment or to comply with any demands
made by that party.45
Braithwaite, P. held that the Company's failure to honour its un-
dertaking constituted a continuation of industrial action within s.66(1).
The Company, therefore, committed an industrial relations offence con-
trary to that section. As a party to a dispute, it continued industrial action
by way of lockout while proceedings in relation to that dispute were pend-
ing before the Court. Consequently, it was in contempt of Court within
s.66(3). The Company was liable for a fine of ten thousand dollars within
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s.63(2) (a) and under s.63(1) (a) liable to pay the workers concerned the
wages, salaries and other remuneration they may have lost as a result of
the Company's continuation of industrial action.
The Court appeais to have taken it for granted that the procedure for
complaining about contempt in these circumstances is the same procedure
contained in s.84, but that section concerns procedure for industrial rela-
tions offences. Admittedly, this offence is connected with industrial rela-
tions but the Act has not included it with the other industrial relations
offences. Granted that the Court has power to regulate its own procedure
4
'
and could quite legitimately follow any procedure, it is submitted that
where the Court decides to exercise this statutory discretion, it ought to
indicate with some clarity what procedure it considers appropriate. It
should not create the misleading impression that the procedure in the
particular instance has been statutorily regulated.
Apart from the case where the magistrate is entrusted with the
power of conviction for the violation of the employees' right to belong to
and take part in union activities, no mention is made about the prosecution
for the other summary offences. It is not clear which Court has jurisdiction
over these offences. Certainly, the Industrial Court is empowered to deal
with contempt matters and industrial relations offences. Which Court
should pronounce guilt on an employer who fails to comply with the
terms and conditions of an agency shop order made by the Registration
Recognition and Certification Board within s.73? Perhaps this situation
may be construed as an industrial relations offence, in which case the
Industrial Court would be competent to handle it. Another possible source
of jurisdiction may arise under s.7(1) (e) which empowers the Court to
hear and determine any other matter brought before it pursuant to the
provisions of the Act. Further, the jurisdiction of the Court may be ques-
tioned in connection with who referred the matter to it, the Minister of
Labour or the recognised majority union? None of them.
C. Industrial Relations Offences
Within the category of the industrial relations offences are the
following:
(1) Failure to Recognise and Treat
One of the means through which the Legislature of Trinidad and
Tobago sought to firmly entrench the system of collective bargaining in
labour relations was to make provisions in the ISA for compulsory recog-
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nition of trade unions by employers for the purpose of collective bargain.
ing.47 The procedure was laid down in s.3 of that Act and although s.3(7)
stipulated penalty for breach of the compulsory recognition provisions,
research has failed to reveal any prosecution under the section, which is
not surprising. Under the provisions of the Act it would have been im-
possible to determine whether recognition has been unlawfully refused in
any given circumstance because the procedure for the determination of
bargaining rights left much to be desired.
48
The 1972 Act has established a better system for ascertaining bar-
gaining rights. The institution entrusted with that function is the Reg-
istration Recognition and Certification Board.4 9 This Board, pursuant to
its duties and powers under the Act, may issue a certification of recog-
nition to a trade union stating that the union is the recognised majority
union for a defined bargaining unit. A duty then arises between that union
and the employer to treat and enter into negotiations with each other for
the purposes of collective bargaining. An industrial relations offence is
committed by either the union or the employer who refuses to carry out
the duty as required by the Act.50
(2) Industrial Actions not in Conformity
with the Act's Provisions
Industrial action may be in conformity with the provisions of the Act
if the action is taken in accordance with the procedures laid down in the
Act.51 Apart from failure to follow the disputes procedures, 52 there are
circumstances in which it is illegal to take industrial action in purely in-
dustrial relations matters. For this purpose, unresolved disputes are grouped
into two categories. First, there are the so-called "rights disputes""s which
must be referred to the Industrial Court for determination. Rights dis-
putes, as contemplated by this phrase; are those disputes concerning the
application to any worker of existing terms and conditions of employment
or the denial of any right applicable to any employee, or those that con-
cern employment, non-employment, suspension from employment, refusal
to employ, re-employment, or reinstatement of any worker.9 4 The sub-
section is so worded that neither party to the dispute can take industrial
action as a means of settling such dispute. 59 It must be referred to the
Industrial Court on application by either party or through the Ministry
of Labour.
Second, where the dispute concerns matters others than those men-
tioned above, as in the case of the so-called "interest dispute," 6 and the
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dispute is declared "unresolved" 57 by the Minister, the parties may choose
either of two lines of action. They may jointly request that the matter be
referred to the Court by the Minister, or, either party may decide to strike
or lockout. The legal validity of such strike or lockout is, however, de-
pendent upon the giving of the appropriate strike or lockout notice by the
party taking the action.58 In the final analysis, disputes in this category
are left outside of the compulsory requirements as in recognition or rights
disputes and can be settled by voluntary means. This is clearly evidenced
by the Industrial Court's opinion in Trinidad Footwear, Ltd. v. Transport
& Industrial Workers' Union59 when the President said:
• . . at the stage at which such a dispute is reported to the Minister
of Labour either party is afforded the opportunity to elect that fail-
ing settlement under the Minister, the dispute is to be settled under
the voluntary principle by 'the arbitrament of private war', and both
parties are thereupon authorised to take such resort.
When the parties are on strike or lockout pursuant to a particular
"interest" dispute, it would appear that their other rights and obligations
under the compulsory aspect of the Act remain intact.60
At any rate, no industrial action can validly be taken other than as
statutorily stipulated, nor could any such action precede the reporting of
a trade dispute to the Minister of Labour. A breach of these procedures
and stipulations by either the employer or the Union may lead to the
commission of an industrial relations offence which is punishable in ac-
cordance with the statutory provisions.1
Although it may be easier to find the commission of an industrial re-
lations offence in strict compulsory arbitration, it has proved futile to
convict in circumstances where the dispute involves "interest" and has
properly been reported to the Minister of Labour. In Tractors & Ma-
chinery, Trinidad Ltd. v. Transport & Industrial Workers' Union,62 the
Union complained to the Industrial Court that after the Union had in-
formed the Company that the workers had ceased their strike which was
consequent upon a breakdown in negotiations between the parties over
new terms and conditions of employment, the Company locked out some
of the workers who had been on strike. The Union contended that the
Company's failure to communicate to the workers that they were locked
out was an industrial relations offence. The court held that since the par-
ties could take industrial action, when the Union called their workers out
on strike, the Company mounted a lockout because "one man's strike is
the other man's lockout." 63 The Court further held that the absence of
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
any notice by the employer to the workers that it was locking them out
did not change the character of the Company's action. Therefore the Com-
pany was not guilty of an industrial relations offence.
III. SOME PRELIMINARY LEGAL PROBLEMS
A. Procedural Issuesa
Even if it is alleged that a trade union or a corporate employer has
breached any of the provisions of the Act and that a prosecution is con-
templated, the question may arise as to how to summon the Union or the
employer to court. In Transport & Industrial Workers' Union v. Bernard,
65
the appellant union was convicted by a magistrate for allegedly calling a
strike in contravention of the provisions of the Industrial Stabilisation
Act, 1965. During the proceedings, the Union appeared under protest and
questioned the validity of the service of summons. The magistrate con-
victed the Union of the offence and ordered it to pay a fine of $2,000
and, in default, distress was ordered to be levied on its property.
The summons requiring the Union to appear and answer the charge
before a Magistrate was served on the President of the Union at the
Union's registered office in Port of Spain. The Union objected that the
magistrate had no jurisdiction to determine the matter since the sum-
mons was not properly served upon the Union. In support of the Union's
case is s.23(2) (d) of the Interpretation Act, 186266 dealing with the serv-
ing of documents, which provides:
where an enactment .. .authorises or requires to be served on any
person without directing it to be served in a particular manner, the
service of that document may be effected . . .
(d) in the case of a corporate body or of any association of per-
sons, whether incorporated or not, by delivering it to the secretary
or clerk of the body or association at the registered office of the
body or association or serving it by post on such secretary or clerk
at such office.
There was no doubt that the Interpretation Act applied to the In-
dustrial Stabilisation Act. In further support of the Union's argument
is the English case of Pearks, Gunston & Tee Ltd. v. Richardson,67 in
which the Divisional Court had to decide whether a writ of summons
issued against a Company was properly served on the Company when the
summons was served in a shop owned by the Company. s.62 of the Com-
panies Act (UK), 1962 provided that:
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any summons, notice, order or other document required to be served
upon the Company may be served by leaving the same or sending it
through the post in a prepaid letter addressed to the Company at the
registered office.
Despite the use of the word "may," it was held that the serving
according to the statutory stipulation was mandatory and that the sum-
mons was bad. In the Transport & Industrial Workers' Case,"1 the Court
of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, on the basis of the English case and
the local statutes already referred to, held that the appeal would be al-
lowed and the conviction quashed on the ground that the writ of sum-
mons was not served on the Union in accordance with the law. The
Court refused to be persuaded by the argument of the respondent which
sought to bring the instant case within the province of s.40(1) of the
Summary Courts Ordinance which provided that:
Every summons shall be served by a constable upon the defendant
either by delivering a copy of it to him personally, or, if he cannot
be found, by leaving a copy of it with some person for him at his
usual or last known place of abode.
The tenor of this provision indicates that it was intended to apply, in the
language of Phillips, J.A., to "actual human beings, natural persons,
physical persons and [it] has no application to legal persons or fictitious
persons which are created by the law and have not actual physical
existence." 69
The principle laid down in TIWU v. Bernard by the Court of Appeal
is still the law in the absence of express statutory enactment to the con-
trary. It is binding on the magistrates dealing with the summary offences.
However, it is submitted that it does not bind the Industrial Court in rela-
tion to its jurisdiction over industrial relations offences since the proce-
dure thereof has been regulated by the Industrial Relations Act. Even in
contempt matters, which are not necessarily classified as industrial rela-
tions offences, where no procedure has been statutorily laid down, it will
be up to the Industrial Court to stipulate its own procedure or follow
recognised judicial procedure. What would appear rather important in the
prosecution of industrial relations offences is the requirement that the
complaint must be made within three months from the time when the
offence took place. Any such complaint after the three months' period
will not be entertained.70 Again, the question of issuing writs of summons
for an alleged industrial relations offence is out because:
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all proceedings for the obtaining of an order against any person in
respect of an industrial relations offence, shall be instituted by an
application to the Court by the employer, the recognised majority
union concerned, if any, or, where there is no such union, any union
which, at the time of the commission of the industrial relations of-
fence has as members of that union workers employed by the
employer.7
1
B. Can a Trade Union be Prosecuted?
Although the Industrial Stabilisation Act created the offences, it did
not expressly state that a trade union can be prosecuted.72 Perhaps that
was thought to be an unnecessary stipulation since there is an over-
whelming amount of case law in the common law jurisdiction to
the effect that a trade union can sue and be sued both in contract73
and tort74 and can be prosecuted in its own name for the commission of
a crime75 in appropriate circumstances. Notwithstanding the case law,
one of the preliminary objections raised by the union in Transport &
Industrial Workers' Union v. Fernandes76 was that a trade union is an
unincorporated body and not a "natural person." Consequently, for a com-
plaint to be instituted against it, there must be some legislative enactment
which expressly or by necessary intentment designates an unincorporated
body or includes such a body in the definition of the term "person" for
the procedural purposes of the Summary Courts Ordinance.
Apart from the fact that the provisions of s.34(1) and (3) of ISA
which set forth the crime under which the union was being prosecuted
expressly state that a trade union can be convicted, the Trinidad and
Tobago Interpretation Act, 1962 provides that:
Words in an enactment importing whether in relation to an offence
or not, persons or male persons include male and female persons,
corporations, whether aggregate or sole, and unincorporated bodies
of persons. 77
It was held that an unincorporated body such as a trade union registered
under the Trade Unions Ordinance is a "person" within the meaning of
the Interpretation Act, 1962. 78
Assuming that there is no Interpretation Act, one may ask how the
Courts have treated trade unions since the enactment of trade union leg-
islation. There are abundant precedents in common law jurisdictions to
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illustrate that the Courts have accorded some legal status to trade unions.
The first time the English Courts had to consider the legal position of the
legislative creature of trade unions was in the famous case of Taff Vale
Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Ry. Servants. 9 The issue was whether
a trade union could be sued in its registered name. In his often quoted
opinion, Farwell, J. said:
although a corporation and an individual or individuals may be the
only entity known to the common law who can sue or be sued, it is
competent to the legislature to give to an association of individuals
which is neither a corporation nor a partnership nor an individual
a capacity for owning property and acting by agents, and such ca-
pacity in the absence of express enactment to the contrary involves
the necessary correlative of liability to the extent of such property
for the acts and defaults of such agents. It is beside the mark to
say of such an association that it is unknown to the common law.
The legislature has legalised it, and it must be dealt with by the
Courts according to the intention of the legislature.80
The learned Justice therefore concluded that such an association could
sue and be sued under its registered name.
Farwell, J. was reversed in the Court of Appeal where it was held
that since the legislature expressly refrained from incorporating a trade
union, it cannot be sued in its registered name. But the House of Lords
unanimously restored Farewell, J's opinion and, despite the subsequent
neutralisation of the effectiveness of the torts aspect of this case,8t their
Lordships' pronouncements in relation to the sueability of trade unions in
their registered names have survived the amending legislation.8 2
The existence of a trade union as a legal entity was again at issue
in the House of Lords case of Bonsor v. Musicians Union. A member
brought an action for damages and an injunction against the Union.
The question revolved around the argument that the contract of union
membership was one between the member and the other members, not
between each individual member and the union as an entity. Accordingly,
the member could not sue himself.8 3 Thus, the member's action could
succeed only if he could show that his contract of membership was with
the union as an entity distinct from the member. In the Court of Appeals, 4
Jenkins, L.J. held that they could not so decide without going to the
lengths of attributing full corporate status to a registered trade union and
he and the other members of the Court were not prepared to do so.
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Despite the complexities which abound in the speeches of the five
Law Lords who sat in the case in the House of Lords, there was a consensus
of opinion among their Lordships that a body such as a registered trade
union could be a party to a contract and therefore could be sued. Their
Lordships, however, differed on the question of the separateness of the
union entity. Lord Morton, with whom Lord Potter agreed, took the view
that the Union, though not an incorporated body, is capable of entering
into contracts and of being sued as a legal entity distinct from the in-
dividual members. Conversely, both Lords McDermott and Somervell
thought that a trade union as an unincorporated association was not a
separate juridical entity and it could be sued in its own name simply
because Parliament, through the Trade Union Act, 1871 had so decreed. 8
The Canadian Courts appear to have a much more developed juris-
prudence on this issue although the question of ascertaining the legal
status of trade unions continues to trouble trade unionists in Canada.
In spite of existing precedents8 6 it was recently argued in O'Laughin v.
Halifax Longshoremen's Association,87 by way of a preliminary motion,
that an action brought against the trade union for wrongful expulsion
by the plaintiff was a nullity on the ground that the union was not a
legal entity capable of being sued in its own name. The motion having
been dismissed by Hart, J. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court,8 8 the union
appealed. Cooper, J.A. of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal took the
opportunity to exhaustively deal with the problem in Canadian jurisdic-
tions.89
Cooper, J.A. held in O'Laughin,90 that the Association was a legal
entity capable of being sued in its own name in the action brought against
it by the member. This was so notwithstanding that the association was
not incorporated or certified as a bargaining agent8 ' because a trade union
is a juridical person and could be sued as such.
In the earlier Canadian case of Re Patterson & Nanaimo Dry Cleaning
& Laundry Workers' Union, Local No. 1,92 the British Columbia Court of
Appeal considered the question whether the union was a legal entity for
the purposes of incurring criminal responsibility in violation of the British
Columbia Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1947. It was held
that the union was a juridical person and could therefore be prosecuted
in its own name. The Court reached this conclusion on the ground that
there was an implied legislative intent to create trade unions as statutory
entities by conferring upon them certain rights, immunities and duties.
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O'Hallaran, J.A. was of the opinion that registration was not the
main reason upon which Tall Vale was decided but that it was "one of
many elements reflecting Parliament's recognition of trade unions as
legal entities."9 3 He cited as an instance the 1902 British Columbia Trade
Union's Act which provided that no trade union and no trustees of any
trade union shall be liable in damages for certain wrongful acts unless
the members of the appropriate governing body have authorised or con-
curred in the wrongful acts. He concluded that this circumstance indicates
that the trade union may be liable for damages in an action against it
in its own name without resort to the representative method of suing
ordinary voluntary organisationsY4
In the Commonwealth Caribbean, the requirement for registration is
compulsory for every trade union.95 Registration, therefore, is the pre-
requisite to legal validity of Caribbean trade unions. As in the case of
England and Canada, Caribbean trade unions are immune from certain
legal actions.96 They are responsible, for all practical purposes, for the
regulation of terms and conditions of employment of their members and
they represent their members in practically every issue concerning them
in the employment place. In Trinidad and Tobago, the same Act which
created the offences in question in the Fernandes Case established new
legal rights for trade unions with corresponding duties on the employers.
The major one was the question of compulsory recognition. The subse-
quent ludustrial Relations Act, 1972 carried that further by establishing
the certification system for collective bargaining purposes.
97 It cannot
then be doubted that by creating rights, liabilities and duties, the legis-
lature of Trinidad and Tobago intended trade unions in the country to
possess some legal personality that should be cognisable at law.
C. When is the Crime Committed?
The answer to this question is essentially one of definition. For
example, in the Metal Box Case,98 the issue of contempt centered on whether
the conduct of the employers amounted to a lockout. Similarly, the In-
dustrial Court may have to consider what constitutes a strike for which
a penalty for contravention may attach and when a trade union may be
deemed to be guilty of calling such strike. Both of these questions have
been determined by the Court of Appeal.
In Martin & Beddoe v. Gift99 the branch secretary of the Union
of Foods, Hotels and Industrial Workers requested an immediate meeting
with the Secretary of the Co-operative Citrus Growers Association, the
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employers, to settle a number of matters outstanding and other agree-
ments made by the parties but not "fully implemented." On the day the
meeting was requested, the Secretary of the Association was off sick and
the appellant was informed he will be able to meet him five days later.
This was not acceptable to the branch secretary who insisted, to no avail,
on seeing the Secretary. Explanations by the Association's Office Manager
were ignored. The following day, the union's President-General, and other
union representatives went with the branch secretary to the Office Mana-
ger's office where the branch secretary allegedly insisted that certain out-
standing matters must be finalised on that date.
A short time later a large number of employees, who normally would
have been working elsewhere on the premises, led by the branch secretary
and the President-General, entered the Association's main office building.
They remained there for most of the day- "talking, laughing, singing
and generally conducting themselves in a way as to make it very difficult
for the office workers to do work." On these facts, the appellants were
charged of, and convicted by a magistrate for the offence of calling out
workers on strike in contravention of s.34(1) of the Act and in accordance
with s.34(3).
In order to constitute a violation of s.34(1), the cessation of work
must be "in consequent of a trade dispute" and the cessation must have
been intended as an instrument of persuasion. 10°
S.2 of the No. 2 Amendment to ISA, a strike meant:
the cessation of work by a body of workers employed acting
in combination, or a concerted refusal or a refusal under a
common understanding of any number of workers employed
to continue to work for an employer in consequence of a trade
dispute, and includes any concerted interpretation of work or
slowing down by workers commonly known as "a sit-down
strike" or "a go-slow" . . 01
Clement Phillips, J.A. (with whom McShine, C.J. and Fraser, J.A. con-
curred) held that there had been a cessation of work by many of the
Association's employees acting in combination. The question before the
Appeal Court was whether the cessation of work was "in consequence of
a trade dispute," ' 2 within the meaning of the Act.
It was :strenuously argued by the Union officials that the cessation
was a consequence not of a trade dispute but of a refusal or failure of
the Association's Management to accede to the request of the Union's
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representatives for immediate consideration of important matters and
could not constitute a trade dispute. The Court of Appeal rejected the
argument.
To determine the meaning of "in consequence of," Phillips, J.A.
looked to the judgments of the English Courts which have expressed
opinions on the meaning of that phrase in various statutes. In the earlier
case of Bromley RDC v. Croydon Corporation,103 where a similar expres-
sion was construed within the context of the Highways and Locomotives
(Amendment) Act, 1878104 as amended by the Locomotives Act, 1898,105
Buckley, L.i. had said:
The amended section runs, from any person by or in conse-
quence of whose order such weight or traffic has been con-
ducted'. These words do not, I think, mean necessary conse-
quences in fact naturally resulting from the order.)06
Kennedy, L.J. agreed with Buckley, LJ's construction of "in consequence
of" but went further by saying that the phrase did not mean natural con-
sequence but rather "something which, as [Buckley, L.J.] said, would
not have occurred in the absence of the contract or work."'
10 7
In a subsequent case, Preston v. Nor]olk County Council,"08 Lord
Greene, M.R. considered a provision in the Agricultural Holdings Act,
1923, which said that "where the tenancy of a holding, terminates by
reason of a notice to quit given by the landlord and in consequence of such
notice the tenant quits the holding, then . . . compensation for the dis-
turbance shall be payable by the landlord to the tenant in accordance with
the provisions of this section .... " The Master of the Rolls for the Court
of Appeal said:
It is true that the validity of the notice was tested and established by
means of an action to recover possession. We do not think, however,
that the answer to the question can depend on whether an ejectment
order is or is not, in fact, asked for or made. In order to ascertain
whether what we have called the 'casual link' exists or not, it is,
we think, necessary to look beyond the mere form of the action and
the mere form of the order' 0 9
Phillips, J.A. concluded that there was a "casual link" between the
existing trade dispute and the cessation of work by the Association's
employees.110 The existence of the trade dispute was the direct foundation
of the union's request, the refusal of which, in turn, led directly to the
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cessation of work. Such cessation of work constituted a strike within the
statutory provision"' and the convictions of the union branch secretary
and President-General were affirmed.
Recently, the Industrial Court had to consider whether a set of facts
amounted to lock-out or strike. The decision would make either the em-
ployers or the union guilty of an industrial relations offence under s.63
of the IRA. In Trinidad and Tobago Meat Processors Ltd. v. Union of
Foods, Hotels & Industrial Workers,112 the butchers of the Company had
refused to slaughter 96 pigs on one afternoon when they were ordered
to clock out early and go home. The following day, they again refused
to obey the order to slaughter the pigs and were given warning notices.
The shop-steward told the management that the order was contrary to the
butchers' terms and conditions of employment and he sought to have
the warning notices withdrawn. Management declined to withdraw the
orders and warning notices. The butchers were given suspension notices
and the shop-steward informed the Production Manager that as from that
afternoon the workers were on strike.
The following day, the other workers, not butchers, clocking in and
assembled in the canteen. Management, through the notice board in the
canteen warned them that their action constituted illegal industrial action.
They were warned later that day of the likelihood of disciplinary actions.
When they reported to the premises on the subsequent morning their time
cards were missing and the gates were closed. The union argued that this
action was a lockout, while the employers argued that the union had taken
industrial action in violation of the provisions of the IRA.
It was held that the Company was not guilty of an industrial offence
because under the circumstances their action did not amount to a lockout
because the workers had "on the two previous working days, entered the
premises and sat down as trespassers refusing to do their lawful duties.
The Company was in the circumstances entitled to refuse entry to any
of them who would not signify an intention to work." The Court further
held that the workers' conduct constituted an illegal industrial action.
IV. PROSECUTING THE CORPORATE EMPLOYER. l3
To establish that a crime has been committed, it is necessary to show
the existence of mens rea, a guilty mind. In prosecuting an employer no
particular problem of proving mens rea is presented when that employer is
an individual or a group of individuals. However, when the employer is a
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corporation, proving the existence of a guilty mind is more difficult, be-
cause in a strict legal sense the employer is not a human person and there-
fore lacks a human mind.
Although there are no Caribbean cases on this problem of prosecu-
tion, the approach of the English common law judges is illuminating. In
the English cases, the principles of agency and viacrious liability in
criminal prosecutions of corporate employers are often considered. The
speech of Viscount Haldane, LC in Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic
Petroleum Co. Ltd.,114 involving the carriage of goods by sea, is often
cited as the classical statement of the English rule:
. . . a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own more
than it has a body of its own; its active and directing will must con-
sequently be sought in the person of somebody who for some purposes
may be called an agent, but who is really the directing mind and
will of the corporation; the very ego and centre of the personality of
the corporation. That person may be under the direction of the share-
holders in general meeting; that person may be the board of directors
itself . . . If Mr. Lennard was the directing mind of the Company,
then his action must, unless a corporation is not to be liable at all,
have been an action which was the action of the Company itself within
the meaning of s.502 ... It must be upon the true construction of that
section in such a case as the present one that the fault or privity is
the fault or privity of somebody who is not merely a servant or agent
for whom the Company is liable upon the footing respondeat superior,
but somebody for whom the Company is liable because his action is
the very action of the Company itself."1
5
The corporation itself need not know about the wrongful act to be
prosecuted for vicarious liability in tort.'" It is sufficient that the wrong-
doer is an employee of the corporation and acted in the course of his
employment. Such vicarious liability may be limited, however by the
scope of authority granted to the employee. In Magna Plants Ltd. v.
Mitchell" 7 the Court held that the only class of persons whose guilt could
be imputed to the corporation are "responsible officers" of the Corpora-
tion. It may not be clear. A car-hire Company's depot engineer was held
in the case itself not to be a "responsible officer," yet a branch sales man-
ager was. Moore v. Bresler.u '
Denning, L.'s stated in Bolton (H.L.) (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. T. I.
Graham & Sons Ltd.:119
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A company may in many ways be linked to a human body. They have
a brain and a nerve centre which controls what they do. They also
have hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions
from the centre. Some of the people in the Company are mere serv-
ants and agents who are not more than hands to do the work and
cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and
managers who represent the directing minds and will of the Company,
and control what they do. The state of mind in these managers is the
state of mind of the Company and is treated by the law as such. So
you will find that in cases where the law requires personal fault as
a condition of liability in tort, the fault of the manager will be the
personal fault of the Company. That is made clear in Lord Haldane's
speech in Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.
1 20
So also in the criminal law, in cases where the law requires a guilty
mind as a condition of a criminal offence, the guilty mind of the
directors or the managers will render the Company themselves
guilty.
t zl
In a subsequent case Lord Parker, C.J. considering the Denning
statement said:
... there is fundamentally no difference between a master who is an
individual and a master who is a limited Company, save that in the
case of a limited Company their knowledge must be the knowledge of
those whom in Bolton (H.L.) Engineering Co. Ltd. v. T. J. Graham
& Sons Ltd., Lord Denning referred to as the brains of the Company.
There is no doubt that there are many cases where the knowledge of
somebody in the position of the brain, maybe the directors, the man-
aging director, the secretary, the responsible officers of the Com-
pany, has been held to be the knowledge of the Company. It seems
to me that that is a long way away from saying that a Company is
fixed with the knowledge of any servant; again to quote Lord Den-
ning: the knowledge of the hands as opposed to the brain merely
because it is the servant's duty to perform that particular task.122
In the recent case of Tesco Supermarkets, Ltd. v. Nattress,123 the
House of Lords considered whether a company could be held criminally
liable for a chain store manager's violation of the 1968 Trade Description
Act. The Divisional Court upheld the conviction on the ground that the
Company had delegated authority to the manager and was therefore liable
for the manager's criminal omissions. 24 The House of Lords found that
the manager was one of several hundred managers of the appellant com-
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pany's supermarket, that he could not be identified with the company, and
that the company had done all it could to implement a proper system for
its store. Consequently, the House of Lords held that the company was not
liable for the manager's criminal omissions. Lord Reed rejected the "alter
ego" concept as "misleading" when dealing with a company.' 25 The court
indicated that a distinction must be drawn between a company's servant,
agent, delegate or representative and that person who is the "embodiment
of the company." If that person, whose mind is the mind of the company,
is guilty of mens rea, then the company is guilty of mens rea as well.
1 26
Tesco, supra, is relevant to the discussion of the Industrial Relations
Act, since it dealt with a statute similar to s.70 of the Act, which provides:
Where an offence punishable under this Act has been committed by
a Company, any person who at the time of the commission of the
offence was a director, general manager, secretary or any other em-
ployee of the Company, not being a worker, or was purporting to act
in any such capacity, shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence,
unless he proves that the contravention was committed without his
consent or connivance and that he exercised all such diligence to pre-
vent the commission of the offence as he ought to have exercised
having regard to the nature of his functions in that capacity and to
all the circumstances.t 2 7
What will in due course constitute a bone of contention is the expression
"or any other employee of the Company." This expression would seem
to be too general but through the use of the popular rule of construction -
the ejusdem generis rule- it may be narrowed down to only those within
the category of officers listed in the section. Thus, a clerk or the man-
ager's secretary may not qualify as any other employee of the Company
within the section.
V. PROSECUTING THE UNION
Both the Industrial Stabilization Act and its succeeding act, the
Industrial Relations Act, provide that trade unions can be held liable for
certain crimes. However, a trade union is an artificial entity and can only
function through the organ of human beings. A trade union, like a cor-
poration, acts through the agency of its officials. In this regard, a primary
question arises: when is a strike called by members of a union considered
a strike called by the union for which the union can be held criminally
responsible? This question arose in Transport & Industrial Workers'
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Union v. Fernandes. 21 In that case, the Transport and Industrial Workers'
Union was prosecuted for calling out their members on strike, contrary to
s.34(3) of ISA. The strike was in fact called by a shop steward. The
shop steward had met the Production Manager at least three times asking
that the Company withdraw certain outstanding cases between the Com-
pany and the union which were pending in the Industrial Court and had
requested an immediate meeting with the workers. When the strike was
on, the Production Manager spoke over the phone to one of the members
of the Executive Board of the union at tile union's headquarters who asked
the Manager "what do you want me to do about that?"
The Magistrate found that the shop steward at the factory was acting
as the agent of the union when he called the strike and that his act con-
stituted that of the union. The union was convicted and fined $3000 and
the union appealed. The Court of Appeal had to decide whether the shop
steward was the agent of the union.The issue of agency was a novel one in
labour relations law, although there were common law cases on the ques-
tion of the civil liability of trade unions for the acts of their officials.
There was, however, no case dealing with the civil or criminal liability
of a union for acts of a shop steward. Furthermore, the ISA did not
specify whose conduct could be taken to be that of the union.
In the cases concerning civil liability of a union, 129 the officials in-
volved were paid officers and therefore servants of their respective unions,
thus creating a vicarious relationship for incurring civil liability. However,
criminal responsibility moves on the premise that a guilty mind is neces-
sary for the commission of a criminal offence. Hence the requirement
for mens rea.1" 0 As in the case of a corporation, a trade union has no
soul, it is merely an "abstraction." A crime by a union can only be
legally possible through the mind of those who could be said to be in
possession of the mind of the union.
Having held that a trade union is a quasi corporation,131 the Court of
Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago proceeded to apply the corporate prin-
ciples of criminal responsibility in the Fernandez Case.13 2 In the opinion
of the Court, whether or not the acts of the shop steward could be said to
be that of the union "must depend on the nature of the charge, the relative
position of the officer or agent, and the other relevant facts and circum-
stances."13 3 It meant also that the shop steward must be in the position
of the "nerve centre" as well as the "brain" of the union.
The magistrate reasoned that, the union, like any other similar body,
could only act through its Executives, officers, servants or agents. Those
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persons must be held responsible for any act done in the capacity in which
they hold office and in connection with the union they serve. If they exceed
their powers, the union may repudiate their actions. Here the union had
chosen to remain silent. Accordingly the conviction was imposed on the
ground that the union was vicariously liable for the acts of the shop
steward done "in the capacity in which he held office." The power of the
shop steward, the Magistrate held, was implied in his duties.
In quashing the magistrate's ruling, the Court of Appeal admitted in
evidence the union Constitution in order to ascertain the union's procedure
for calling strikes. Under the union rules, no strike or any type of with-
drawal of labour shall be called without the "sanction of the Executive
Board." The power of the Executive Board in calling a strike was subject to
consultation with the particular Branch of the union that would be involved
in strike action. The union Rule provided that "any member or members
violating these conditions shall be reported to the General Council by
the Executive Board for such action as the General Council may deem
fit." From these regulations, two propositions emerge: first, the power to
call a strike is vested in the union's Executive Board alone; second, there
is no implied authority in any other person to call a strike, with the pos-
sible exception of those very high officials whose acts would easily be
ratified by the Executive Board. The Court ruled that a trade union may
be criminally liable for the acts of such of its responsible officers as form
the brain centre of the union, or, in the case of an individual, a person to
whom delegation in the true sense of delegation of management, has been
passed." 4 Thus, the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the act of the
shop steward, under the circumstances of the case, could not properly be
considered to be the act of the union for the purposes of incurring criminal
liability under s.34(3) of the ISA.
The concept of implied authority rejected by the Court of Appeal in
Fernandes has now been accepted by the House of Lords in Heaton's Trans-
port (St. Helens) Ltd. v. Transport & General Workers' Union.135 In
Heaton's, shop stewards were also involved in an industrial action. A joint
committee of shop stewards had "blacked" the appellants' lorries at the
Liverpool docks. Under the Transport & General Workers' Union Rules,
shop stewards were elected for the purpose of "representing membership on
matters affecting their employment," and in doing that, they "shall receive
the fullest support and protection from the union." The Committee had
prepared a document which they expected all haulage firms carrying
goods into or out of the Merseyside dock and the union to sign in which
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the firm should give an undertaking not to load or unload containers
without consultation. When the appellants refused to sign the agreement,
their lorries were consequently "blacked" at Liverpool docks.
The appellants complained to the National Industrial Relations Court
that by blacking their lorries the union was guilty of an unfair industrial
practice under s.96(1) of the new repealed Industrial Relations Act, 1971.
Despite the Court's order to restrain the blacking and the subsequent fines,
the blacking continued contrary to the request of the Union's General
Secretary. The union appealed against the fines, the orders, and the
Court's refusal to review the case. t36 In the Court of Appeal, it was held
that although the shop stewards were themselves in contempt of the Court's
order, the union was not guilty of unfair industrial practice since the
shop stewards were neither servants nor agents of the union and were not
carrying on any tasks delegated to them by the union. The Court of Appeal
found that there was no evidence to suggest that the shop stewards had
either expressed or implied authority from the union to act as they did.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal set aside the orders of the Industrial
Court.'
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Restoring the order of the Industrial Court, the House of Lords, in an
unusual joint judgment delivered by Lord Wilberforce,"'5 rejected as
irrelevant the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeal between the shop
stewards who were agents rather than servants. According to their Lord-
ships the test was the same: "was the servant or agent acting on behalf of,
and within the scope of the authority conferred by, the master or prin-
cipal?"' 139 Their Lordships found that the original source of the shop
stewards authority was the agreement entered into by each member
joining the union whereby the members authorised specific persons or
classes of persons to do particular kinds of acts on their behalf. Some
authority could be also implied from custom and practice. It was held that
there was evidence of a general implied authority for the shop stewards
to defend and improve the rates of pay and working conditions of the
members whom they represented by negotiation or industrial action, in-
cluding blacking, at the relevant place of work, and as that authority was
.not withdrawn, the union was guilty of unfair industrial practice. 140
It is a matter of conjecture whether a subsequent Court in Trinidad
and Tobago, faced with the facts similar to those in Transport and Indus-
trial Workers' Union v. Fernandes,'4' would abide by that decision or
follow Heaton Transport v. TGVU.142 A number of distinguishing features
are, however, manifest in. two cases. First, Fernandes was a case of crim-
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inal prosecution while Heaton was purely a civil case. This distinction is
perhaps paramount for the consideration of whether criminal guilt re-
quires more than a finding of vicarious which is the requirement for a
finding of civil wrong.
Second, there is the important difference between the structure and
arrangements in the government of trade unions in the Caribbean and
those of their English counterparts. There is, in general, a concentration
of power at the centre in Caribbean trade union government and there is
no such devolution of authority as may have been possible within the
U.K. Transport and General Workers' Union. The size of the English
Unions makes devolution and decentralisation feasible and expedient,
whereas in the Caribbean, unions are relatively small and their Head-
quarters are easily accessible.
Third, the nature of the action involved may be relevant. In Heaton,
the industrial action constituted an unfair industrial practice, while in
Fernandes, the strike was punishable as a crime. While other types of
industrial action may be taken with the authority of Junior officers,
decisions on strike actions are often reserved for the Executive Com-
mittee of Caribbean Trade Unions.
Fourth, shop stewards in the Caribbean are chosen mainly at
the particular branch work place. They are not, strictly speaking, elected
union officers. Finally, "the absence of any reference in the IRA as to
who may make a trade union liable under the sections confirms sub
silentio that this decision stands. 143 It is submitted that Fernandes was
rightly decided in the circumstances. At any rate, Heatons must be con-
fined to its peculiar facts and circumstances.
Indeed, the choice between Fernandes and Heatons fell on the Indus-
trial Court in Trinidad and Tobago Meat Processors Ltd. v. Union of
Foods, Hotels and Industrial Workers.144 There the facts manifestly indi.
cate that the workers had taken part in an industrial action and the ques-
tion was whether the union was responsible for that action and therefore
guilty of committing an industrial relations offence. The only officer of the
union involved in the action was a shop steward who fully supported and
participated in the action. The question, therefore, was whether his role
was sufficient to support the charge that the union was guilty of an
industrial relations offence. As the Court pointed out, the Company's
complaint against the union could only be upheld if the union itself
was responsible for taking the industrial action.
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It must be observed that in dealing with contempt of the Court for
non-observance of its orders or awards, s.7(8) of the IRA provides:
for the purposes of the foregoing provisions of this section, a
trade union and the holders of office in a trade union or other
organisation shall be deemed to be guilty of a breach of an
order or award (including an order made under s.6(5) by which
the union ...is bound, if a worker or other person who is a
member of that union . . . commits that breach by the direction
or with the concurrence of any holder of an office in that trade
union or other organisation.
Again, in defining the holder of "office in relation to a trade union,"
s. 2 (p) (ii) includes a shop steward.
On the other hand, there is no provision in the Act imputing liability
to a trade union for acts of a union official in relation to an industrial
relations offence under s.63.145 Determining that there was no evidence
that the shop steward was empowered by the union rules to call a strike
or that anyone entitled under the rules to take such action had delegated
the power to the shop steward, the Industrial Court treated the matter as
decided by Fernandes. Braithwaite, P. rejected the company's submission,
based on Heaton's, that delegation need not come from the top as effective
authority can be conferred on shop stewards expressly or implicitly from
the bottom as not being of much assistance to the Company's case.
In Heatons, Lord Wilberforce warned that the case did not establish
a principle of general application; ". . . it is necessary to emphasize that
this question has to be resolved exclusively within the context of the
actual disputes before the Court relating to particular localities, and on
the evidence before it." The Industrial Court heeded this warning. It held
that because the workers of one branch of the union follow the directions
of one shop steward to take strike action, this cannot be said to confer
authority on the union Shop steward to undertake strike action on behalf
of the entire union. Consequently, the Company's case failed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing sets out the measures which, in the process of establish-
ing the new System of compulsory labour adjudication, the law-makers
in Trinidad and Tobago have thought necessary to take. These measures
have meant the creation of crimes previously unknown to the law of
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labour relations either in Trinidad and Tobago or any other Common.
wealth Caribbean jurisdiction. As the study has endeavoured to show, the
emergence of these crimes has triggered off a number of legal problems.
But the practical problem of enforcing crimes of the type contained
in the industrial relations legislation of Trinidad and Tobago has already
been noted.' 46 This problem has been borne out by the fact that notwith-
standing the numerous breaches of the Industrial Relations Act, no prose-
cution has been made under the summary offences section of the Act.
One such attempt to prosecute Central Bank workers in 1975 attracted so
much publicity that the Attorney General found it politically expedient
to withdraw the charges.
On the other hand, it has been seen that recent prosecutions have
taken place in connection with contempt matters and industrial relations
offences. The reason probably is that unions and employers, in sheer
desperation and desirous of settling their disputes have complained to
the Industrial Court in order to stop economic sanctions from being
imposed upon them by the other side.
Notwithstanding the problem of enforcement and the legal issues
discussed in this paper concerning prosecution of the parties for contra-
vention of the various offences, it is clear that a new regime of crimes
peculiar to labour relations has come into existence not only in the field
of labour relations but also in the criminal law of Trinidad and Tobago.
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